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F
Abstract—The proliferation of IoT in various technological
realms has resulted in the massive spurt of unsecured data. The
use of complex security mechanisms for securing these data
is highly restricted owing to the low-power and low-resource
nature of most of the IoT devices, especially at the Edge. In
this work, we propose to use blockchains for extending security
to such IoT implementations. We deploy a Ethereum blockchain
consisting of both regular and constrained devices connecting
to the blockchain through wired and wireless heterogeneous
networks. We additionally implement a secure and encrypted
networked clock mechanism to synchronize the non-real-time
IoT Edge nodes within the blockchain. Further, we experimen-
tally study the feasibility of such a deployment and the bottle-
necks associated with it by running necessary cryptographic
operations for blockchains in IoT devices. We study the effects
of network latency, increase in constrained blockchain nodes,
data size, Ether, and blockchain node mobility during transaction
and mining of data within our deployed blockchain. This study
serves as a guideline for designing secured solutions for IoT
implementations under various operating conditions such as
those encountered for static IoT nodes and mobile IoT devices.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, blockchain, Edge nodes,
Ethereum, Constrained-networks
1 INTRODUCTION
A majority of the present-day IoT solutions are
plagued by limitations such as constrained energy,
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limited computing capabilities, high-degrees of mo-
bility, and many others. In terms of security and pri-
vacy of IoT devices, vulnerabilities such as weak or
hardcoded passwords, insecure network segments,
poorly protected interfaces, unsecured data access
mechanisms, insecure data transfer mechanisms,
and other challenges make a majority of IoT devices
prone to easy manipulation and disruption. Fur-
thermore, the massive deployments of IoT devices
often make it impossible for a network administra-
tor to pin-point malicious or compromised devices
amongst the deployed devices.
The nature of the devices in IoT, especially
at the Edge, is vastly heterogeneous. As the IoT
devices at the Edge primarily focus on ensuring
low-power connectivity and basic computation, a
significant chunk of these Edge devices does not
possess sufficient processing power or resources
to host conventional network security mechanisms.
Typically, IoT Gateways are popularly associated
Fig. 1: An outline of a typical IoT-based Industrial
ecosystem
2with providing security to the IoT devices/nodes
under its operational purview. The current state-
of-the-art IoT infrastructure relies on a centralized
Gateway to process and aggregate data from IoT
devices [1]. The centralized Gateway plays a vital
role in ensuring the security of the sensed data.
The Edge devices may be static or mobile, and
they not only sense and transmit data, but also
perform actuation based on the data received from
other IoT devices. This trend clearly shows that
the majorly adopted centralized approach is not
scalable and will soon become a bottleneck, which
necessitates distributed technologies to replace the
role of the Gateway. A centralized approach of-
ten leaves the IoT nodes under the domain of a
Gateway, quite open to security breaches such as
unauthorized access to data directly from the Edge
devices. Rather than focusing on traditional security
solutions, which rely majorly on remotely hosted
security mechanisms such as at Cloud or cen-
tralized Gateways, the requirements of IoT-based
systems necessitate distributed solutions [2]. These
distributed solutions primarily focus on the IoT
devices at the Edge [3] or even utilize hardware-
based security [4].
Towards this objective, we analyze the perfor-
mance and feasibility of using blockchains – a
promising distributed security paradigm for ensur-
ing data security for IoT-based systems [5]. Archi-
tecting a blockchain-based solution for IoT systems
at the Edge requires addressing the following chal-
lenges:
• More the number of Edge devices in the
IoT ecosystem that is part of the blockchain,
more is the work-load of each of these
blockchain nodes. The generally constrained
nature of the network associated with the IoT
systems/devices further makes it challeng-
ing for the devices to partake in network-
based blockchain operations reliably.
• Blockchains require real-time synchroniza-
tion between its nodes. Most of the con-
strained IoT Edge devices do not have an
internal clock for time synchronization, mak-
ing it necessary to come up with solutions to
address this lacuna.
• The resource-constrained nature of most of
the Edge IoT devices require mechanisms to
handle processing-heavy blockchain-based
operations.
Why Ethereum? – In this work, we deploy a
Ethereum blockchain consisting of IoT Edge devices
as its nodes and experimentally verify the perfor-
mance of this approach. As Ethereum is an open
and public blockchain, in addition to being highly
customizable, we have considered it to test our im-
plementation. Similar to Ethereum, solutions such
as IOTA can be a viable choice for implementing our
solution. However, unlike Ethereum, IOTA’s central
coordinator is a close-source project, which does
not allow us to customize smart contracts and add
features. Other blockchain frameworks, such as Hy-
perledger’s Sawtooth and Fabric are permissioned
blockchains, which restricts the free interaction of
the IoT nodes with the blockchain system, in turn,
making their configuration complex, especially for
dense deployments and rapidly changing configu-
rations of the nodes. The proposed work establishes
the feasibility of using day-to-day IoT devices as
blockchain nodes and can be used as nodes for dif-
ferent blockchain frameworks. Our implementation
additionally allows for the integration of security
features of Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) [6]
and other encryption algorithms on top of the pro-
posed blockchain via smart contracts. These encryp-
tions can be reliably used to ensure the correctness
of the time string and the time synchronization.
Provision for unified network time synchroniza-
tion– To secure the data generated and exchanged
between IoT devices in a distributed manner, we
propose the use of low-power IoT Edge nodes (refer
Table 1) as the blockchain nodes. These nodes are
not only capable of continuing their regular sensing
and actuation tasks, but also perform necessary
blockchain functions such as verification, mining,
and transactions. However, as most of the Edge
devices do not have an internal clock, they have
no provision to automatically synchronize their
time to the network. To alleviate this problem,
we additonally propose a centralized time server
ensures synchronization of system/network time
across the various resource-constrained Edge de-
vices. The conjunction of a centralized time server
and a decentralized blockchain approach, makes
this work a hybrid one – not completely centralized,
nor completely decentralized. Our implementation
allows for the integration of additional security
features and other encryption algorithms to the time
string from the central server to the IoT nodes, and
on top of the data transmitted to the blockchain
from the distributed IoT nodes. These encryptions
can be reliably used to ensure the correctness of the
time string as well as preserving the privacy of the
data being transmitted to the blockchain.
31.1 An IoT-based Industrial Ecosystem Applica-
tion Scenario
We envision a real-life use case of an IoT-based in-
dustrial ecosystem for motivating the applicability
of this work. Fig. 1 shows the significant physi-
cal and infrastructural components of an industrial
complex. We choose an industrial complex primar-
ily because of the massive density of deployed Edge
devices, and the constrained nature of the network
arising due to the high density of these devices
and challenging areas of implementation – prone
to interference and noise from the environment.
Constraints to network and device capabilities are
automatically induced in such ecosystems due to
the presence of dedicated automation and control
systems working with new as well as legacy in-
frastructures. It is common to see both wireless and
many variants of wired connections for communi-
cation in industrial ecosystems. In continuation, the
heterogeneity in devices in terms of their mobility,
processing abilities, and energy consumption also
makes it a challenging environment for implement-
ing secure IoT systems.
The amounts of data generated and flowing
through the network in an IoT-enabled industrial
ecosystem are quite massive. The use of blockchain
introduces the features of transparency and trace-
ability to the IoT data generated within the indus-
trial ecosystem. Both constrained IoT Edge nodes, as
well as regular computing stations, can be incorpo-
rated within this setting. In our experimental evalu-
ation, we fashion the blockchain nodes as such that
they consist of both regular computing platforms
such as PCs as well as constrained IoT Edge nodes
consisting of Raspberry Pi boards (refer to Table
1). Here, we deploy a small four-node blockchain
testbed. The preliminary, yet crucial trends and met-
rics obtained from this small-scale implementation
is indicative of the overall behavior of our approach.
From a security point of view, more nodes on the
blockchain will increase the security and reduce
the computational load from other nodes by shar-
ing blockchain operations. Therefore, increasing the
nodes will only enhance the security, trust and
reliability. The data privacy of the system can be
further ensured using techniques such as private
transactions and ABE [6]. Private transactions have
encrypted data within the blockchain transaction.
Specific attributes depending on implementation
scenarios can be used to develop smart contracts
to ensure customized data privacy. For example, in
the considered scenario, device locations or moni-
toring equipment details can be good attributes for
defining group access policies for IoT monitoring
implementation in industrial scenarios.
1.2 Contributions
The nature of the data plays a decisive role in
evaluating the requirements of security and privacy
to be used at the IoT devices. However, the in-
tegrity of data is an irrefutable need for all IoT data
types and needs, which is ensured by the private
blockchain. In this work, we make the following
distinct contributions:
• We incorporate the heterogeneity of IoT de-
vices by including both small nodes – con-
strained, with fewer resources and process-
ing power – and large nodes – nodes with
abundant resources and processing power.
We incorporate network heterogeneity in our
implementation by making use of both fixed
Ethernet-based network connections as well
as including WiFi-based connections.
• We also propose a centralized network time
synchronization in conjunction with the de-
centralized blockchain. The proposed time
synchronization allows for setting and co-
ordinating time on the resource-constrained
Edge devices, which do not have an internal
clock.
• We evaluate the various interactions of con-
strained IoT devices with blockchain net-
works, even when they have heterogeneity
in their connection and/or are mobile.
TABLE 1: Blockchain node specifications for our
implementation
Features Node-1 Node-2 Node-3 Node-4
Device Raspberry
Pi3-B+
Raspberry
Pi3-B+
Dell
Power
Edge
T410
server
Raspberry
Pi3-B+
Processor Quad
Core 64
bit ARM
cortex at
1.2 GHz
Quad
Core 64
bit ARM
cortex at
1.2 GHz
16x4
Core 64
bit at
2.67 GHz
Quad
Core 64
bit ARM
cortex at
1.2 GHz
RAM 1 GB 1 GB 32 GB 1 GB
Network
connection
Ethernet Ethernet Ethernet WiFi
1.3 Related Work
There have been several efforts in the recent past
to integrate blockchain with IoT networks. Works
such as the one by Lao et al. outline the challenges
4associated with integrating and redesigning typi-
cally resource-intensive blockchain mechanisms –
architecture, consensus, and traffic – with the inher-
ently resource-constrained IoT devices [7], whereas
Wu et al. provide a thorough analysis of issues
and tentative solutions for implementing IoT-based
blockchains by dividing their evaluation under four
architectural layers – data, network, consensus, and
application. Approaches such as hybrid public-
private blockchains [8], inclusion of additional mes-
sage verification devices with blockchains [9], in-
corporating smart contracts [10], [11], implementing
ABE with blockchain transactions to ensure privacy
of data [6], and many others [12] provide promi-
sion solutions and indicate the feasibility of using
blockchains for IoT networks.
Dorri et al. demonstrate an energy-efficient use
of blockchains in IoT systems by using distributed
trust algorithm instead of Proof-of-Work (PoW) [13].
Similarly, utilizing Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS)
instead of PoW for enhanced privacy of data, Proof
of Authority (PoA) [14], blockchain hosted at IoT
gateways for dense deployments [15], blockchains
for fog/edge devices [16], and other modifications
to blockchain mechanisms [10] are some of the
works ensuring reliable integration of blockchains
for IoT, and that too with additional features. IoT
blockchains have been successfully proposed for
use in diverse, but complex application areas, such
as smart cities [17], healthcare [11], crowd-sourcing
[18], and others.
Extending the use of blockchains for Industrial
IoT (IIoT) applications is even more complex as
industrial IoT deployments are marred by the chal-
lenges of dense device deployments, heterogeneity
(of devices, data, and protocols), increased inter-
ference/ signal distortions, and the need for real-
timeliness of data and decisions. Systematic sur-
veys, such as those by Choo et al. [19] and Mis-
try et al. [20] povide furtehr insights to the chal-
lenges and the upcoming solutions for the use of
IoT blockchains in industrial scenarios. Approaches
such as BASA [21], ELIB [22], LightChain [23], Tor-
nado [24], and others show promising results for the
use of modified IoT blockchains in industrial sce-
narios. Besides accomodating the base functionality
of blockchains under constrained operating condi-
tions, these approaches additionally offer the bene-
fits of improved identity-based access management,
lightweight concensus mechanisms, distributed and
enhanced throughput management, reduced laten-
cies, optimized resource efficiencies, certificateless
cryptography, and many more.
However, most of the works consider fairly
powerful computing devices at the edge of the IoT
network, which are not necessarily non-real-time.
Also, a majority of the works do not address the is-
sues of mobility, network and device heterogeneity,
and the need for device synchronization with the
network time (especially for non-real-time devices
such as Raspberry Pis). Through this work, we
attempt to cover these gaps and provide a real-life
evaluation of the implications of using blockchains
in IoT networks.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we implement an Ethereum-based
blockchain on heterogeneous IoT nodes, some of
which connect to the blockchain over an Ethernet-
based connection, whereas the others connect
through a WiFi-based connection, forming a hybrid
network connection as shown in Fig. 2. Further,
adding to the device heterogeneity, the devices
themselves have different specifications and pro-
cessing capabilities, as outlined in Table 1.
IoT blockchain nodes have unique “ENODE”
values and connect using these values. The “EN-
ODE” value consists of a public key, an IPv4 ad-
dress, and a port number. Simulating a real-life IoT
implementation, we have incorporated heteroge-
neous IoT nodes, some with low processing power
and reduced energy requirements (i.e., Raspberry
Pi) and some with high processing power and more
significant energy requirements (i.e., server, PC).
The Raspberry Pi-based nodes connecting over WiFi
are considered as mobile and treated as such during
the performance evaluation of our setup. However,
these IoT nodes in our blockchain are capable of
independently handling their transactions as well
as mining.
2.1 Incorporating blockchain for IoT
Fig. 2 outlines the representative network architec-
ture of our implemented IoT blockchain. The net-
work can be considered to consist of heterogeneous
nodes (N1-N4). These nodes may consist of large
static devices such as servers and PCs, or they
may be small and portable consisting of Raspberry
Pi boards. All these devices act as nodes in the
blockchain. A switch connects an external back-
bone network to the internally formed network.
The network connections from the switch may be
either used for connecting physically to the IoT
nodes through Ethernet or wirelessly through a
5Fig. 2: The representative network architecture of
our implemented IoT blockchain
wireless access point. An external (centralized) en-
crypted time server is also used to provide network
time synchronization to the IoT devices, which are
mostly non-real-time.
TABLE 2: Specifications of our private blockchain
Blockchain specifications Values
Gas limit (in Hexadecimal) 0x47b760
Gas limit (in Decimal) 0x4700000
Difficulty 0x1
Consensus Engine used Clique - Proof of Authority
(PoA)
Time (in sec) each block takes 5 seconds
Number of accounts on each
node
1
Accounts which are allowed
to seal
Accounts of all the nodes
HomesteadBlock 1
EIP150 Block 2
EIP155 Block 3
EIP158 Block 3
Gasprice for node 1 3× 1055 wei
Gasprice for nodes 2, 3, 4 3× 1028 wei
Syncmode full
We implement a private blockchain to account
for the low-processing capabilities of the imple-
mented IoT nodes, as well as keeping the data and
transactions localized within an application area.
Each of these nodes runs an Ethereum framework,
the specifications of which are outlined in Table
2. Each of these nodes has an account associated
with it over the Ethereum framework and uses a
“CLIQUE- Proof of Authority (PoA)”, instead of
regular “ETHASH- Proof of Work (PoW)” to re-
duce mining times and reduce the average energy
consumed by the nodes. The transaction of Ethers
and data are performed based on the “ENODE”
values of each node, which are subsequently mined
by intended nodes. Post successful completion of
a transaction, Ether balance is updated to a receiver
node’s account by the same amount it gets deducted
from the sender’s account. The Ether balance with
the sender node was initially logged at 7.519wei,
the whole of which gets transferred to the receiver
upon completion of a transaction. Unlike public
blockchains, which deal with unknown and trust-
less systems, the private blockchains do not need
an incentive-based mechanism to work.
We automate the process of an IoT node joining
the blockchain, generating data, and performing
transaction and mining operations. Algorithm 1
highlights this automation process. On power-up,
each IoT node boots into a startup file containing
the multi-threaded instructions and commands for
time synchronization using the encrypted network-
broadcasted time string and initialization of the
node’s Genesis file. Subsequently, each of the ac-
tivated nodes checks for transaction data (to send
or receive), which is then mined and submitted
accordingly. Blockchain contracts can also be de-
ployed similarly. Irrespective of a node’s processing
capabilities, the nodes are self-sufficient to carry
out mining operations on their own. It is prudent
to mention that in the absence of proper time
synchronization, the connection between nodes is
interrupted, resulting in association and disassoci-
ation with the blockchain. This drop in connection
results in a significant increase in mining times at
the affected nodes.
Algorithm 1 Node automation
while DEVICE POWER ON do
Locate node blockchain automation file
Initialize Genesis file
Start mining
if (Transaction Data == TRUE) then
Submit the transaction and generate receipt
end if
end while
2.2 Encrypted Time Synchronization
Operations such as mining rely heavily on the syn-
chronization of time and its maintenance between
the nodes of the blockchain. Our implementation
requires the communication of an encrypted time
string to a node joining the blockchain for the
first time or every time it is powered on from a
central time server. This provision has been kept
mainly because of the absence of Real-Time Clocks
(RTC) in the resource-constrained IoT devices. Ev-
ery time these devices power-up, the internal clock
6resets to the default value, which is unlike personal
computers or machines with RTCs. Further, unless
the sender and receiver nodes have a common
system time, network security provisions prevent
them from joining the network or communicating
reliably, especially for blockchains.
Networked time synchronization: Any external
efforts to include a network-based time synchro-
nization should be secure enough to ensure long-
lasting and interference-free membership of the IoT
nodes to the blockchain. In case the time server
or any message generated from it is compromised
or altered, the IoT nodes forming the blockchain
will get dissociated, resulting in the breakdown of
the blockchain. To avoid any such eventuality, we
additionally implement the use of an encrypted
time string from a centralized time server (refer
Fig. 2), which can be read only by the member
nodes of the implemented blockchain as outlined in
Algorithm 2. Further, approaches such as ABE can
be just as easily incroporated with this approach to
further strengthen the reliability and security of the
time string. Considering a typical IoT scenario, the
inclusion of thousands, if not millions of devices in
the proposed scheme would overwhelm even high-
end servers. However, using approaches such as
ABE with suitable group access policies, the same
time string can be utilized by a group of IoT nodes,
instead of individually customizing and encrypting
each time-string for synchronization purposes [6].
This enhances the scalability of the time synchro-
nization approach. Additionally, as the proposed
time synchronization is centralized, the effects of
anomalies associated with distributed systems, such
as Byzantine failure, are absent.
Resilience of the proposed approach: The time
server has a record of all the member nodes of
the blockchain along with their “ENODE” values.
The IP of each node corresponding to its “ENODE”
value gets periodically updated at this time server.
For our encryption, we adopt a different node –
different encryption policy [6], which adds an addi-
tional level of security to our IoT blockchain. The
synchronizing encrypted time string is customized
according to each of the registered member nodes,
which can only be decrypted by the target IoT node
using its “ENODE” value as the private key. Any
attempts to falsify or manipulate the IP address of
the node or the ENODE address will result in a clash
in the records at the server, alerting the network ad-
ministrator of this attempt. As the server broadcasts
the time strings over the blockchain network, all
the nodes can see the encrypted message, but only
the designated node with the proper “ENODE”
value can decrypt it. The mapping of IP addresses
and ENODE values also prevents the duplication of
ENODE values by malicious nodes. Further, the en-
crypted time string meant for a node will be relayed
multiple times, similar to a typical networking sce-
nario, if the time server is not directly connected to
the target node.
Algorithm 2 Time Synchronization
SERVER
n← number of nodes
message← time string
Replicate ENODE and IP of all the nodes in the time
server
for i = 1 to n do
IP [i]← IP of ith node
end for
for i = 1 to n do
key[i]← ENODE
Encrypt time string using ENODE →
ENODE(message)[i]
for all i do
send IP [i]← ENODE(message)[i]
end for
end for
RECEIVER (intended node)
TIME ← original time of the node
During node startup DO
Copy ENODE → file.txt
Receive encrypted time Tep
Auto decrypt using ENODE of the node Tdp
Set TIME = Tdp
The case of compromised IoT nodes: Concerning
a Man-in-the-Middle Attack for modifying the time,
the encrypted time server (refer Fig. 2) is tasked
with periodically updating the mapping of ENODE
and IP addresses of the participants in the private
blockchain. As the ENODE values are unique to
each blockchain node, these ENODE values can
be uniquely mapped to the nodes’ IP addresses.
Even if there is a change in the node’s IP address,
the periodic check by the time server ensures its
update in the mapping repository. Once a node with
the proper IP address receives the encrypted time
string meant for it, only it can decode it using its
unique ENODE value. The mapping of IP addresses
and ENODE values also prevents the duplication of
ENODE values by malicious nodes.
3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this work, we establish a private Ethereum
blockchain with four nodes, following the archi-
tecture outlined in Fig. 2, the exact specifications
7(a) Average network latencies
across nodes
(b) Average CPU usage vs. num-
ber of connecting nodes
(c) CPU usage before mining (d) CPU usage during min-
ing
Fig. 3: Network and node performance characteristics for our implemented IoT blockchain
of which are briefly outlined in Table 1. Two of
these nodes (nodes 1 and 2 in Table 1) are non-
real time, static systems with constrained processing
power and energy, and which join the blockchain
network through the Ethernet. The third node (node
3) has significant processing resources and does
not have any energy constraints as it draws power
directly from the grid. This node also takes part in
the blockchain through a dedicated Ethernet-based
connection and is deemed a static node. Finally,
the last node is yet another non-real-time, resource,
and energy-constrained node similar to nodes 1
and 2, but takes part in the blockchain through a
wireless connection (WiFi) as it is mainly mobile.
It is to be noted that both the Ethernet and WiFi-
based networks are not established dedicatedly for
this evaluation, but are part of a single institutional
network over which a significant number of users
communicate simultaneously at any time of the day.
3.1 Effect of Encryption Algorithms
To evaluate the performance of our approach and
ensure additional security and privacy measures,
we encrypt the timestring from the centralized
server to the IoT nodes, as well as the data from
the nodes being forwarded on the blockchain using
two algorithms – RSA and the 256-bit AES. We
analyze the standalone effect of these algorithms
on the CPU usage and energy consumption of the
resource-constrained devices, as shown in Fig. 4.
We have first used AES and RSA in a standalone
mode to encrypt data on the IoT node. Thereafter,
both of these encryption algorithms are used to
encrypt data before it is mined in the blockchain
– the IoT node simultaneously runs one of these
algorithms along with blockchain operations, which
are denoted as AES256(BC) and RSA(BC) in Fig.
4(a). From the same figure, we observe that for
varying data sizes, the four algorithms have compa-
rable CPU usage (neglecting the intermittent outlier
behavior observed in some of the readings). We
calculate the processing energy required for these
security measures from the CPU utilization of each
type of IoT device [25]. From Fig. 4(b), we observe
that although the energy consumed for executing
each of the four algorithms (AES, RSA, AES256(BC),
and RSA(BC)) is significantly small, the RSA and
AES256(BC) have a high variance for data sizes
ranging from 10B to 1000B.
(a) Percentage of CPU usage (b) Energy consumed (in nJ)
Fig. 4: Performance of various security measures on
a resource-constrained IoT node
3.2 Performance of Encrypted Time Synchro-
nization
As the proposed time synchronization essentially
follows the same approach as evaluated in Section
3.1, the performance of proposed encrypted time
synchronization concerning CPU utilization and
node energy follows the same trend. However, it is
to be noted that the data size of the encrypted time
string lies between 30B - 50B, the performance of
which is reflected in the initial stages of the plots
in Fig. 4. We observe an average latency of 0.4 ms
to 0.7 ms on each of the nodes 1, 2, and 4 while
they receive information/ connection requests from
other nodes. However, node 3 connecting to the net-
work through a WiFi-based connection encountered
average latencies of around 13 ms to 50 ms when
receiving messages from the other nodes. Similarly,
8nodes 1, 2, and 4 observe average network latencies
of up to 24ms to 33ms, when receiving messages
from node 3.
3.3 Effect of Network Latency
Considering the network architecture discussed
previously, Fig. 3(a) shows the comparison between
network latencies while sending ping packets from
each node to every other node (designated as Tar-
gets 1 -3) in the network. We observe that for ping
queries over the Ethernet-connected nodes, the re-
sponse time is significantly lower than that of the
one connected over WiFi. Additionally, we observe
that the response time for ping from Node-3 (server)
is relatively lower than the responses from the
resource-constrained nodes (Nodes- 1 and 2), even
when connected over the same Ethernet-based con-
nection. These relatively higher latencies incurred
due to the resource-constrained nodes (Nodes-1 and
2) is attributed to the time taken by them to process
the packets. In continuation, the significantly higher
latencies at Node-4 can be attributed both to its
resource-constrained nature, requiring more time to
process the packets, as well as its mobility, which
causes it to have unstable network characteristics.
These latencies are crucial in estimating the per-
formance of our implemented IoT blockchain and
act as the network performance baseline. In PoW
blockchains, increased network latencies can lead
to increased block convergence times and failure of
six confirmations [26]. However, in this work, as
we adopt a PoA concensus mechanism, which is
much faster than PoW and PoS based mechanisms,
the effect of network latency on the security of the
blockchain is minimized. In PoA, only reputed val-
idators can approve transactions on the blockchain,
which is very useful for IoT-based scenarios.
3.4 Effect of Increase of Node on CPU Usage
Fig. 3(b) shows the average CPU usage (denoted in
%) for a randomly selected constrained node in our
blockchain network. We observe that as the number
of network connections to that node increases, the
nodes’ average CPU usage goes up to maintain the
connections to and from it. An important takeaway
from this observation is that resource-constrained
nodes support only a limited number of simulta-
neous network connections, which necessitates the
use of distributed security solutions for reliable use
of such nodes.
Further, Fig. 3(c) represents the CPU usage at
each of the four implemented nodes before joining
the blockchain, whereas Fig. 3(d) represents the
CPU usage in the same nodes during mining in
the blockchain. From Figs. 3(c) and 3(d), we observe
that the three constrained nodes (Raspberry Pi) in-
cur almost 5-8 times the CPU usage as compared to
the regular node (server). Additionally, the mobile
constrained node (connected to the WiFi), incurs
further resource usage (CPU usage) as compared to
the constrained nodes connected to the Ethernet.
(a) Average mining time (b) Average transaction time
Fig. 5: Variation in blockchain performance with the
variation in data size
We further observe that being part of the
blockchain and performing its operations induces
a massive increase in CPU usage of the devices by
almost 10 times as compared to when the devices
are operating on their own (refer Figs. 3(c) and
3(d)). For resource-constrained nodes, the percent-
age CPU usage is about 5 to 7 times more as
compared to that for the node with ample stor-
age and high processing power. As in our imple-
mented blockchain, nodes 1, 2 and 4 are resource-
constrained, we observe their average CPU usage to
be around 31.686%, 35.323%, 43.704% respectively,
while node 3 which is a server accounts for about
6.536% of CPU usage during blockchain mining
operations.
3.5 Effect of Data Size
Fig. 5 shows the effect of data size on the IoT
blockchain operations of our implemented system
from the perspective of the static nodes. Fig.5(a)
shows the variation in mining time when the size of
the data used for transacting over the blockchain is
varied while the amount of Ethers transacted is kept
fixed at 750 wei. The sender and receivers involved
in the transaction are also kept fixed. We evaluate
the performance of mining in our implemented IoT
blockchain by using transaction data packets of size
10 bytes, 50 bytes, and 100 bytes. We observe the
same variation in mining time for different data
sizes over 30 repetitions of this exercise for each
data size. Except for some random cases where
9mining time may show an increased deviation from
the norm (as can be seen for the 50 byte data packet
in Fig. 5(a)), the mining time for all these data sizes
remains reasonably consistent. We attribute these
random unexpected values to unstable and con-
gested network behavior and the induced latency
thereof.
(a) Average mining time (b) Average transaction time
Fig. 6: Variation in blockchain performance with the
amount of Ethers transferred
Similarly, Fig. 5(b) shows the variation in trans-
action time for the same repeat of the exercise
outlined above. Similar to the observed behavior in
mining time, the transaction operation also reports
some unaccounted-for surge in transaction time,
which we again attribute to fluctuating network
conditions. As the plot in Fig. 5(b) shows the aver-
age behavior, considerable fluctuations in network
conditions tend to disturb the norm, which for most
of the cases, is reasonably consistent.
3.6 Effect of Ether
Fig. 6 shows the effect of Ethers on the IoT
blockchain operations of our implemented system
from the perspective of the static nodes transacting
a data of 100 bytes over the blockchain. Fig. 6(a)
shows the variation in mining time on varying
the number of Ethers transacted while keeping the
data size fixed to 10 bytes, between pre-determined
senders and receivers. We transact 1 wei, 105 wei,
and 1010 wei in our blockchain for over 30 times in
each case. We observe that the variations in mining
time remain almost the same for all cases except
for some unexpected random fluctuations because
of varying network conditions, which is evidenced
from the apparently high error bar in the plots.
Similarly, Fig. 6(b) shows the variation in trans-
action time for the same exercise as described above.
For each of the three cases, i.e., for 1 wei, 105wei,
and 1010 wei, we observe almost the same type
of variations as reported previously. We attribute
this randomness in behavior to unstable network
conditions. The randomness distorts the norm of
(a) Average mining time (b) Average transaction time
Fig. 7: Variation in blockchain operation times with
respct to various nodes
the readings for all three cases, as is evident from
the significantly larger error bar in the plots.
3.7 Effect of Node Characteristics
Fig. 7(a) shows the variation in mining time at node-
1 with the change of receiver nodes while keeping
the data size fixed at 100 bytes and the number
of Ethers at 750 wei. The make of the nodes is
described in Table 1. We observe that there is almost
no difference in mining time when nodes 2 and 3 –
connected to the blockchain over an Ethernet-based
connection – act as receivers of the data. However,
there is a significant rise in mining time when node-
4, which connects to the blockchain over WiFi, is
made the receiver of data from node-1. The error
bar for the plot of mining time at node-4 indicates
a massive fluctuation of values, indicating unstable
network connection.
Similarly, Fig. 7(b) shows the variation in trans-
action time for transactions between node-1 and the
other three nodes under the same operating condi-
tions, as mentioned earlier. Here we observe that
there is an increase in the average transaction times
at node-1 when the transactions are performed be-
tween it and nodes 2-4. The increase in transaction
time at nodes 3 and 4 are caused due to random
variations in network latencies due to intermittent
network connections, as evidenced by the relatively
higher error bars in the plots for these two nodes.
3.8 Effect of Node Mobility
In contrast to the static node analysis until Section
3.7, in this Section, we evaluate the performance of
the network as well as the implemented blockchain
from the perspective of a mobile node. The mobile
node under consideration is node-4, which connects
to the blockchain through a WiFi-based connection,
which gives it the ability to relocate without chang-
ing any physical configurations quickly. To estimate
the network quality available to this node when
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(a) Mobile node to a static
node
(b) Static node to a mobile
node
Fig. 8: Network latency encountered during ping
operation
it is mobile, we perform two network-based tests
– 1) check the network response time when the
mobile node queries an address over the network
during mining operation, and 2) check the network
response time when a static node queries the mobile
node’s address during mining operation.
Fig. 8(a) shows the network latencies witnessed
by node-4 during the first test. Whereas, Fig. 8(b)
shows the network latencies witnessed by a static
node during the second test. It is to be noted that
the static node connects to the network through a
fixed Ethernet-based connection. We observe that
there is a considerable variation in the recorded
network latencies as node-4 moves through regions
of weak and strong WiFi signal strengths. This
mobility and fluctuations in signal strength further
give rise to intermittent connectivity issues such as
the unavailability of the network (as seen in Fig.
8(a) between instances from 33 to 46). The network
stays unreachable until the mobile node enters into
a zone of good signal strength. As a result of this
behavior, there is an induced lag in mining times
whenever mobile nodes connect to the blockchain
over constrained networks.
Fig. 9(a) shows the variation in mining time for
two different data sizes, i.e., 10 bytes and 100 bytes
while transacting between a static and a mobile
node in our implemented blockchain. The consider-
able variations in mining times, as evidenced by the
error bars, are a result of unstable network connec-
tions when the mobile node traverses through zones
of good and bad signal strengths. Considering equal
network variations during the transference of the
two data blocks, we observe that the norm for
100 bytes is higher than that for 10 bytes of data,
indicating higher mining time incurred for more
significant data sizes.
Similarly, Fig. 9(b) shows the variation in trans-
action time for the two selected data sizes, i.e., 10
bytes and 100 bytes while transacting between a
static and a mobile node in the network. We again
observe the average transaction time of 100 bytes
data packet to be slightly higher than that for 10
bytes data packets, which is due to the increase in
time required to transmit and process the data. The
variations and increased values of the error bars
signify intermittent network connectivity, resulting
in higher transaction times for the mobile node.
Further, Fig. 9(c) shows the variation in mining
time for three different amounts of transacted Ether,
viz. 1 wei, 105 wei, and 1010 wei while transacting
from the static node to the mobile node in the
blockchain. Here, we consider the bar for 105 wei
to be the standard baseline as its error bars are rel-
atively much lesser than that of the other two bars.
The increased error bars for 1 and 1010 wei indicate
an increase in network-based disturbance, which
affects the mining operation, even for increased Gas
prices.
Similarly, Fig. 9(d) shows the variation in trans-
action time for the three different amounts of trans-
acted Ether, viz. 1 wei, 105 wei and 1010 wei, when
they transfer from a static node to a mobile node
of our blockchain. As compared to the mining time,
the transaction time experiment witnesses relatively
lesser network disturbances, as evidenced by the
smaller error bars for 1 wei and 105 wei.
4 CONCLUSION
As a significant majority of IoT Edge devices and
IoT networks are resource-constrained, the provi-
sion for incorporating reliable security measures
is often not available for these devices. These re-
strictions have resulted in an abundant presence
of unsecured data propagating through IoT net-
works and make the Edge devices susceptible to
unauthorized access and tampering. In this work,
we have proposed and analyzed the feasibility of
incorporating heterogeneous IoT Edge devices as
functional blockchain nodes to extend the feature
of decentralized security to resource-constrained
IoT deployments. We also implement an encrypted
network-based time-synchronization mechanism to
enable the non-real-time IoT Edge nodes to co-exist
in the blockchain.
We conclude that the feasibility of utilizing a
blockchain-based decentralized security at the IoT
Edge devices itself is significantly high in terms of
restricting data repudiation and enforcing trust in
the constrained deployment, which were previously
susceptible to manipulation. However, the underly-
ing connectivity of the network and the minimum
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(a) Average mining time vs
data size
(b) Average transaction time vs
data size
(c) Average mining time vs
Ethers used
(d) Average transaction time vs
Ethers used
Fig. 9: Evaluation of parameters during transmission of data from static to mobile IoT nodes
processing capabilities of the blockchain nodes con-
trol the blockchain performance, which further re-
stricts the nature of the sensing and actuation tasks
that the Edge node can accommodate. In the fu-
ture, we plan to design and develop methodologies
to incorporate processing-intensive tasks such as
computer vision with our implemented blockchain
at the Edge, in addition to the evaluation of the
large-scale behavior of the proposed solution as an
extension of this work.
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